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Article 8

MAN, SOCIETY AND
MORALITY .
Phillip D. Adams
Man hangs from a precipice-his fingers clawing for a firmer grip:
knowing that regardless of whether he falls or in some manner is
able to pull himself up and gain surer footing, he will be unable
to claim his distinctiveness as man. His one position of distinctiveness
is that he is hanging from that precipice. As the French gentleman
of the fifteenth century would say: "Rein ne m'es sure que la chose
incertaine." (I am sure of nothing except the uncertain.)
The differences between man and animal are few. However important these differences may be, it must be realized that while they are
the basis of man's elevation above the animal kingdom, these same differences are the cause of most of man's conflicts- both personal and
social.
First of all, man is characteristically a rational being. He is able to
withdraw into himself and contemplate his future actions. He can
reflect upon the past, analyzing the acts he has committed, and can,
according to a notion that has prevailed for many centuries, "learn
from his mistakes and the mistakes of others."
Secondly, man is endowed with imagination. He can imagine, or
dream of, what the ideal status, actions and accomplishments of
man could and should be. Although the element of imagination is
dependent upon man's rationality to a certain extent, it is still the
major source from which man draws his moral idealism. It is by
combining imagination and rationality that man forms the means by
which he realizes and judges the motives under which he acts and the
interests of others. lmmagination, while providing man with his ideals
is also one of the basic debasing elements in man's nature, "Man will
always be imaginative enough to enlarge his needs beyond minimum
requirements and selfish enough to feel the pressure of his needs more
than the needs of others.'
An animal acts by instinct and necessity. A hungry animal realizes
it is hungry and it instinctively attempts to satisfy its hunger. The
means by which the animal obtains the food it craves is largely a
matter of instinct, but in addition there may also be a conditioned
reaction as taught, perhaps, by its parents: It must not be confused
with the rationality of man-it might be called "developed instinct."
The animal has nothing to restrain its natural instincts and
cravings and, hence, there can never be any guilt attached to its
actions. Animals are non-rational-unconscious of their instincts. Since
they are unconscious of their instincts and have no means at their
R einhold Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society (New York, 1947 ) ,
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disposal to restrain them with, they cannot be held responsible for
their actions or reactions. Thus there is never an actual moral problem when one is concerned with the actions of an animal.
There is an inherent element in man's nature that prompts him
to strive towards a state of self-transcendence in which he is able
to consider the desires and needs of others, and to strive towards the
achievement of a harmonious relation with them. In the process of
attempting to establish a harmonious relationship with others man
restrains his natural impulses and instincts by a will guided and
controlled by the workings of his rationality and imagination.
Man is aware of himself and those around him. He is conscious
of them, and with this consciousness there arises the consideration of
others that makes man tend to restrain his actions. Restraint usually
lies in dependence upon rationality, but, as Reinhold Niebuhr points
out: "No man will ever be so intelligent as to see the needs of others
as vividly as he recognizes his own, or to be as quick in his aid to
remote as to immediately revealed necessities."'
Because man is able to restrain his actions with respect to those
around him, he must be held responsible for his actions. Men do
possess, with all their other moral resources, a sense of obligation
toward the good as their mind conceives it.' As long as man is consciom of this obligation, he can, and must be held responsible for
it. "If man loses his consciousness he cannot be found quilty because
he is not responsible.'"
One of the most important features of man's attitude at the
present time, and perhaps all time, is that even though he is completely conscious of this responsibility he consistently ignores it.
Ortega y Gasset notes two fundamental traits of the mass-man of
today: "the free expansion of his vital desires, and therefore, of his
personality; and his radical ingratitude towards all that has made
possible the ease of his existence.'"
In other words,. man ignores the worth of other men and their
desires while being conscious of them. The trait of man, as Gasset
states it, is ingratitude, not unconsciousness or unawareness. "In the
last resort ... each individual has the responsibility of choice (between
moral and immoral );' and it is a responsibility that is not to be
escaped.'" Man does not tend, however, to recognize moral responsibility. If man recognized this moral responsibility for his deeds society
could be remade by remaking man. The obvious fact remains that
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while man is conscious of his moral responsibility he is not responding
to it.
Man's make-up is also characterized by a conscience, which may
be defined as "any emotionally-toned experience in which a tendency
to act is inhibited by a recognition, socially conditioned, that suffering
evil consequences are likely to result from acting on the impulse to
act.• Conscience is a moral resource, but it is a resource dependent
upon social relationships and only be made actual in the light of
the ideals of conduct which man professes. The Stoics and Kantians
have placed too much emphasis on the natural obligatory force of
the conscience-it is not as powerful as they would have us believe.
Their position has been that by emphasizing and developing man's
rationality mankind could develop a sense of duty adequate enough
to provide mankind with a totally moral society. But no man will
ever be so intelligent as to completely subjugate himself to a sense
of duty.
Man is, by his very nature, a social being. He associates with
other beings and to a certain extent is concerned with their welfare,
or at least their existence. It must be poined out, however, that the
individual and social existences of man are at the same time distinctively separate and intricately woven together. "The moral life is a
way of life for men in society," and, "it has at the same time a personal relevance and dimension or sphere of being"" The moral life
is both a personal and a social effort.
Religion is a personal moral force. And although it produces, in
varying degrees, many moral influences upon the attitudes of society,
it nevertheless retains its individual nature, for it is upon the individual
that the moral ideals of religion have their greatest force.
The most characteristic ideal of the religious morality and, indeed,
of individual morality, is unselfishness. And while the moral ideal
of unselfishness is worthy of a great deal of respect, it must be noted
that it is not without pit-falls. It is distinctly different from the
politico-ethical ideal of justice that is both characteristic of and
necessary for social harmony.
The religious ideal of Love, as manifested in unselfi!>hness, is
totally unrealistic.. M en who have in the past claimed that the hope
of a moral society lay only in the absolutism of religion must be made
to realize that " All men cannot be expected to become spiritual any
more ·t han they can be expected to become rational." ..
Furthermore there is always the possibility that the
perfectionism, which prompts religious generosity, is
more interested in the perfect motive than in ideal consequences. Preoccupation with motive is an unvarying
characteristic of the religious life, which has its own
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virtues, but it is also responsible for the many absurdities
which have been committed in the name of religious
philanthrophy; absurdities which are inevitable when the
benevolent spirit disregards the social consequences of a
generous action."
Preoccupation with motive is also true of the rational moralists,
such as Kant and the Stoics, who, while professing duty, hold that
the motive upon which an act is committed is all-important. Perhaps ·
motive is as important as they make it on a personal basis, but one
must be careful to always take into consideration the possible social
consequences of an action to be committed, even though there is an
ideal motive prompting the action. No one has he right to do
injusrice to another simply because he acts from a perfectly unselfish
motive.
The truly religious person generally tends towards one or the
other of two extremes: he becomes a religious ascetic, thereby absolving
himself from all social responsibility, or he convinces himself that he
has more influence on the morality of his society than he actually
has. As a religious individual, however, the rewards that are to be
reaped will be reaped only by him, and have a bearing on society
only in so much as he is a member of that society.
All this is not to imply that the religious ideals expounded and
acted upon by man do not have some influence upon the attitudes
and the morality of society. Indeed, the leavening effect that religious
altruism has upon society has great significance and cannot be denied.
As one progresses from normal personal relationships to collective or group life another weakness of religious altruism, with regard
to its moral practicability, becomes increasingly apparent. The social
ideal of justice is difficult to attain, if it is ever attained, but it is
even more difficult to attain the religious ideal of love (unselfishness) .
There is always present, however, in every movement towards social
justice, an element of religious altruism.
Wl:.ether it be on a religious or a rational basis, as individuals,
men believe that social justice should be established, but whenever
they are members of an economic, racial or social group they use
all the power that they can command in order to take whatever they
desire or in order to justify their own social position and actions on
moral grounds.
Whereas individuals proclaim the moral ideal or unselfishness,
the ideal society holds highest is that of justice. Unselfishness is primarily a product of the heart, while justice is a product, at least
partially, of man's rationality. Justice is man's answer to the evils
of social inequality. Society needs greater equality not only to advance
but to survive. The basis of social inequality is, basically, the unequal
distribution of power within the society.
There are, primarily, two types of social power-economic and
military. It is with these two types of power that men rise above their
11
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fellow human beings and assert themselves as members of a privileged
class or group.
Military power has always been and probably always will be a
prime source of social cohesion, especially where nations are concerned. Th~ oppression that comes with a conquering force is characteristically unjust. The methods employed to combat military power
and economic power have often met with little success, and yet have
had tremendous influence on the attitudes of those possessing the
power.
There have been, first of all, the attempts to combat the imposed
injustices with open violence. This is perhaps the most common way
to fight injustice. It is the type of resistance offered by the French,
under the leadership of General DeGaulle, after the Nazi occupation of
World Wat II. And at the present time it is the type of resistance being
offered by many of the Latin American countries where the people
are revolting against the tyrannical oppressions of dictators.
The second type of resistance offered by oppressed groups is
non-violence, which takes two distinct forms : non-violent resistance
and pure non-violence (pacifism).
Pure non-violence, or pacifism, is the only means of resistance
(actually it is complete submission to oppression) which has no resulting consequences that can injure or cause hardship for any other
member of the·society.
The consequences that follow pacifism vary according to the will
of the oppressive group. Often times the pacifists are simply annihilated, but the effect that the pacifistic attitude may have may be
far-reaching and may influence, ultimately, the moral principles of
the oppressing force. Needless to say, pacifism often results in martyrdom which in turn tends to strengthen the faith of those united in the
pacifist movements. Pacifism is connected primarily with religion,
as exempliefied in the practices of the Anabaptists and the Mennonites.
There is another extremely important point that should be brought
up whenever one discusses pacifism; that is, if everyone were to follow
the pacifistic principle of Christ's doctrine "Resist not evil" (Matt.
5: 39) without devoting himself coordinately with equal integrity to
a complete moral doctrine, society would soon be reduced to a state
of anarchy.
Non-violent resistance is by far the most common of the two
forms (Ghandi is generally considered the leading exponent of nonviolent resistance) , and is usually expressed by civil disobedience,
boycott or strike. Non-violence has been misunderstood by a ' large
portion of mankind for a long period of time, and it is often confused
with pacifism. The moral implications of non-violent resistance are
sometimes as disastrous as those resulting from violent resistance. The
consequences of non-violent resistance are definitely more difficult
12
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to measure than those of open violent resistance, but non-violence, too,
can destroy property values and even human life. Although it is
negative in its expression it may have very weighty and positive consequences. A strike, for instance, may destroy property values of an
industry, and men, women and children, not engaged in the conflict,
may suffer from the resulting hardships. Any form of resistance is
inevitably bound to affect in some manner or another the other
members of a community.u
In truth it would seem that the only morally justifiable position
is that ot a pacifist: It, for the Western World, is the only one of
the above enumerated modes of meeting with oppression or force
that is at all coincidental with the Christian ideals of religious
benevolence, humility and Love. In the Eastern religions, such as
Hinduism and Buddhism, we also find that moral emphasis is placed
on the ideals of humility and unselfishness.
·
Yet, generally speaking, we find that man has always considered
himself to have a dual nature, and finds no difficulty in morally
justifying his position of fighting for ideals of morality, social or
personal, by wielding a bloody sword in direct opposition to the ideals
he holds most high. The position that man takes on this issue is,
perhaps, an attempt to reconcile the immediate needs of the present
with the concept he has of the ideal future.
But, as long as there is any formidable amount of social power
which provides the basis for social inequality, the ideal future can
never be attained. As long as there is social inequality there will be
majorities and minorities, whose conflicting interests can never be
completely resolved. Regardless of the effect of the resistance offered
in opposition to the injustice of the superior power, we find, for the
most part, that majorities or minorities must yield to those who posses
either military or economic power. As Reinhold Niebuhr so aptly states:
Moral factors may qualify, but they will not eliminate,
the resulting social conflict. Moral goodwill may seek to
relate the peculiar interests of the group to the ideal of
a total and final harmony of all life. It may thereby
qualify the self-assertion of the privileged, and support
the interests of the disinherited, but it will never be so
impartial as to persuade any group to subject its interests
of the group to the ideal of a total and final harmony of
all life."
If the moral factors will not resolve conflicting interests man
must rely on a certain amount of coercion to resolve the conflicting
interests, and, reciprocally, the use of this power tends towards injustice.
The technological civilation that we live in "has created an
international community, so interdependent as to require, even if
not powerful enough to achieve, ultimate social harmony"" This technological civilization is characterized by the centralization of industrial
ownership (the source of economic power) n the hands of a few in13
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dustrial lords. The individual has been lost in the mass of laborers.
Hence, mankind is faced with a situation in which the possessors of
economic power, and likewise the laborers en masse, are not responsible to anyone other than themselves.
Those who hold power in a group generally consider themselves
as privileged. In fact, they regard their privileged status as just reward
for achievements of the past. Perhaps carried over from this attitude
of the privileged class is the tendency of that class to perform philanthropic acts. The generosity of the privileged classes has been interpreted in various ways. It may be that they are attempting to incite
the envy of those in the lower status. It is more likely that their
philanthropy is a means of justifying their privileges. Nevertheless,
they who have the power exercise it to maintain thir privilegesjustifiable or not.
There have been many attempts to overcome the injustice that
is associated with social inequality and privileged groups. Perhaps in
the past few years the most prominent or favored means of trying
to undermine the established privileges of the power classes has been
enacted in the name of the Marxist theory.
The Marxist thory holds that the injustice found in social life
is due to the unequal distribution of power within a society. The
significant moral contribution that has been brought to light through
Marxist thought is that special privilege is intricately involved with
the ownership of the means of production.
The error in Marxist philosophy is that those who profess it ignore
individual life and its moral problems. They assume that all problems
of morality and life are social, and that society can be manipulated
like a machine. They hold that once the construction and workings
of the social machine are understood all personal problems will
automatically be solved. This error is comparable to believing that
a corn on the toe of an individual should be treated by cutting off the
whole foot.
Henry David Thoreau states: "There will never be a really free
and enlightened State until the State comes to recognize the individual
as a higher and independent power from which all its own power and
authority are derived, and treats him accordingly.'"' Thoreau was of
course a person who sometimes anti-everything that was associated with
civil law and power. There is, however, some merit in what he says,
for the individual, as the basic element in social life, must be considered in the workings of society and his ideals and aspirations taken
into account.
The moral problem that man faces is unquestionably : Can he
be moral? Is it possible to have, within the personal and social spheres,
a perfect moral life?
As was noted before, man has elemental distinctions that raise
him above the animal world-rationality, imagination, conscience,
etc. These elements are present in man's nature to be sure, but with14
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out an interdependence upon each other they near meaninglessness.
It is only when they are combined and coordinated that they have
significance, for ultimately the one major distinction of man is that
he has moral potential. The previous elements discussed are important,
but unless they are culminated in the development of a morality they
do very little to make man anything other than a superior animal.
It is extremely important to note, however, that unless man is moral
he cannot lay claim to his distinctiveness.
It appears paradoxical to say that man's great distinctiveness is
his morality, and then conclude that man is incapable of attaining
complete social and personal morality, yet, this is the situation in
which man finds himself. He is unable to attain social harmony and
the ultimate ideals of perfect morality simply because he is man, and
because there are forces present within society that tend to make man
immoral. Paul Tillich, a prominent figure in contemporary theology
states the same thing when he says:
Man is bound to sin in all parts of his being, because
he is estranged from God in his personal center. Neither
his emotion, his will, nor his intellect is excepted from
sin and, consequently, from the pervision of their true
nature. This intellect is as distorted and weakened as his
moral power.'"
Tillich is concerned mainly with the individual and his relation
to moral limits, but if we conclude that individuals are incapable of
becoming "sinless" we cannot expect to establish perfect morality in
the social orders.
This is not to say that man's position should be considered as
completely hopeless, for there are great possibilities for man to improve his moral stature by developing the capacities that make his
morality at all possible. If man applies his rationality with integrity
it can greatly aid him in the suppression of his dishonest pretensions
and ego-centered desires. Human intelligence can increase the benevolence of man and help him to consider the desires, needs and rights
of other human beings.
Thus it is that man hangs from that precipice. He is unable to
raise himself up to the level of perfect morality and social harmony,
and he does not dare to allow himself to lose his hold and drop into
that position where he will be unable to claim his distinctiveness as
man.
15
16

Ernest Earnest, The Uses of Prose (New York, 1956) , p. 477.
Paul Tillich, Biblical Religion and the Search for Ultmnate Reality
(Chicago, 1955), p. 55.

22

